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Sticks, Stones, and So-Called Judges: Why the Era of
Trump Necessitates Revisiting Presidential Influence on
the Courts
QUINN W. CROWLEY *
INTRODUCTION
In the United States, there is a long history of Presidents and other elected
officials clashing with the courts. 1 These clashes have often been about complex and
significant issues, including the role of judicial review in American jurisprudence,
slavery, New Deal legislation, and the treatment of Native Americans. 2 Presidents
choose to attack the judiciary for a number of reasons, but it is not entirely clear
where the line should be drawn between legitimate acts of presidential dissent and
acts of active hostility meant to undermine the legitimacy of the judiciary. Moreover,
what is the consequence of a judiciary whose legitimacy is weakened over time?
While the legislative branch is able to constitutionally alter the courts, primarily via
jurisdiction stripping and judicial impeachment, the executive is much more limited
in terms of legitimately checking the judicial branch. 3
This Note will be primarily divided into three main sections. Part I of this Note
will begin by discussing the importance of judicial independence in modern society
and the role of elected officials in shaping the public perception of the courts.
Additionally, as problems of judicial legitimacy are age-old and date back to
America’s founding, Part I will include a brief discussion of an early clash between
President Thomas Jefferson and the courts.
Parts II and III of this Note will seek to place President Trump’s conduct
towards the judicial branch within the proper historical context. Part II examines the
ways in which Presidents have been able to significantly alter the makeup of the
judiciary while in office. For considerations of brevity, this section will include a few
illustrative examples in which Presidents have sought to alter the makeup of the
courts, and each will be discussed in the context of the actions of President Trump.
Part III will explore instances of Presidents undermining the legitimacy of the
judiciary by making comments about pending and past court cases, particularly using
examples from more recent administrations. This Note concludes that, while

* J.D. 2019, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; B.A. 2016, University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign. I would like to express my appreciation to Professor Dawn Johnsen for
providing feedback, guidance, and advice throughout the drafting of this Note. I would also
like to thank Executive Online Editor Alexis Daniel and the Online Editors for their hard work
during the publication process.
1. See generally KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN
U.S. HISTORY (2007).
2. See id.
3. STEPHEN M. ENGEL, AMERICAN POLITICIANS CONFRONT THE COURT: OPPOSITION
POLITICS AND CHANGING RESPONSES TO JUDICIAL POWER 31 (2011); see also Richard E. Welch
III, “They Will Not Open Their Ears”: Should We Listen to the Supreme Court and Should the
Court Listen to Us?, 47 NEW ENG. L. REV. 93, 113–114 (2012).
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President Trump’s behavior regarding the judiciary has been the subject of intense
media scrutiny during his first two years in office, it is important to place his
comments and actions in a historical context by looking at the examples set by past
Presidents. Through this frame of analysis, this Note concludes that, although
President Trump’s rhetorical attacks on the independence of the judiciary—
particularly in the criminal context and in targeting individual judges—have been
numerous and unprecedented, 4 President Trump is also quietly shaping the makeup
of the judiciary in a way that could become even more drastic if his administration
embraces a modern Court-packing plan or continues to make judicial appointments
at staggering rates.
I.

BACKGROUND

When the courts, and particularly the Supreme Court, render opinions, the vast
majority of Americans digest the information handed down by the courts through
second-hand sources, primarily the media and elected officials. 5 Thus, there is
considerable variation in the ways in which information can be presented to ordinary
citizens by the media and elected officials, especially given that so few Supreme
Court decisions are actually discussed in-depth in the mainstream media. 6
Underlying this fact is the notion that, for the vast majority of citizens, the Supreme
Court is viewed as being the legitimate final arbiter of the law, as being independent
from the political branches, and therefore as being “worthy of protection from
political interference.” 7 Indeed, recent public opinion polling shows that roughly
sixty-eight percent of Americans have either a “great deal” or “fair amount” of trust
and confidence in the judicial branch, which tends to be much higher than other
institutions, and public confidence in the courts has remained high over time. 8 Thus,
elected officials, and particularly the President, play a critical role in shaping the
public debate around Supreme Court decisions, particularly regarding media
coverage on controversial cases. 9
According to some, including at least one former Supreme Court justice,
rhetorical attacks on the judiciary by the other branches of government have arguably
“accelerated” in past years. 10 Moreover, as will be discussed in detail below,

4. See Neil S. Siegel, Reciprocal Legitimation in the Federal Courts System, 70 VAND.
L. REV. 1183, 1233 (2017) (“[Trump] is disparaging the federal courts and particular federal
judges in ways that are unprecedented in modern times.”); see also Jeffrey Rosen, Not Even
Andrew Jackson Went as Far as Trump in Attacking the Courts, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 9, 2017),
https://perma.cc/BWQ5-7FPG.
5. MICHAEL A. ZILIS, THE LIMITS OF LEGITIMACY: DISSENTING OPINIONS, MEDIA
COVERAGE, AND PUBLIC RESPONSES TO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 5 (2015).
6. See id. at 16.
7. Id. at 10; see also Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation:
Three Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773, 776–77 (2002).
8. Supreme Court, GALLUP NEWS (2017), https://perma.cc/VBC3-U2TK; see also ZILIS,
supra note 5, at 11, 13. See generally Or Bassok, The Supreme Court’s New Source of
Legitimacy, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 153 (2013).
9. ZILIS, supra note 5, at 42.
10. See ENGEL, supra note 3, at 1, 3 (noting Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s observations
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criticisms of and attacks on the judiciary are not unique to one political party over
another. 11 One of the primary reasons public confidence in the courts is so important
is the lack of an enforcement mechanism. 12 Alexander Hamilton famously described
the judiciary as being “the least dangerous branch,” in large part because it “has no
influence over either the sword or the purse.” 13
Presidential conflict with the courts is an age-old issue which dates back to the
earliest days of American democracy. 14 As law professor Charles Geyh notes,
“[b]outs of Court directed animus have come and gone at generational intervals, since
the founding of the nation,” including clashes involving Thomas Jefferson, Andrew
Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt. 15 Judicial independence
has also been the focus of debate and scholarship since the founding of the nation. 16
Judicial independence was of particular importance to the Founders, as they were
dissatisfied with colonial judges who lacked independence and “who served at the
pleasure of the king.” 17
Examining historical practice in this area of separation of powers jurisprudence
is critical because the Constitution—excluding the appointments clause 18—is silent
as to what constitutes proper interactions between the President and the judiciary. 19
Curtis Bradley and Trevor Morrison state that “[p]residential power in the United
States is determined in part by historical practice . . . [e]specially when the text of
the Constitution is unclear or does not specifically address a particular question.” 20
This silence of the Constitution regarding the relationship between the
President and the judiciary is particularly relevant in understanding anti-Federalist
clashes with the judiciary at the turn of the nineteenth century. As professor Barry
Friedman notes, tensions between Jefferson and “highly partisan” Federalist judges
ultimately resulted in the impeachment of Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase, 21
who to this day remains the only Supreme Court justice to have been impeached. 22

about increased “criticism of judges across America”); see also Welch, supra note 3, at 95
(“Conservative politicians railing against federal judges is nothing new, but recently the
rhetoric has increased in intensity.”).
11. See ENGEL, supra note 3, at 1.
12. See id. at 14.
13. The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
14. See CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE STRUGGLE
FOR CONTROL OF AMERICA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM 2 (2006).
15. See id.
16. See id. at 24.
17. See id.
18. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States.”) (emphasis
added).
19. See Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional Conventions,
and the Judicial Separation of Powers, 105 GEO. L.J. 255, 269–70 (2017).
20. Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical Practice,
and Legal Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097, 1098 (2013).
21. Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The
Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 364 (1998).
22. Keith E. Whittington, Reconstructing the Federal Judiciary: The Chase Impeachment
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The prevalence of partisan judges is exemplified by the so-called “midnight
appointments” made by outgoing President John Adams, which ultimately led to
Marbury v. Madison. 23 It was this decision that led to Jefferson’s belief that, in the
words of Friedman, “according the power of constitutional interpretation to any one
branch was a prescription for tyranny.” 24 Debates about departmentalism and
constitutional interpretation by the executive branch have persisted over time, 25
though this is beyond the purview of this Note. Instead, Jeffersonian clashes with the
judiciary are only meant to illustrate that Presidents have fought with the courts since
the earliest days of American democracy, and that examining historical practice is
necessary in evaluating the actions of President Trump.
II.

ALTERING THE COURTS AND TARGETING JUSTICES

Influencing the makeup of the Supreme Court using the appointment power is
one way in which Presidents can legitimately attempt to influence the outcome of
cases in ways that agree with their political views. 26 This section will discuss
examples of attempts to alter the makeup of the courts by examining the actions of
Presidents Roosevelt, Nixon, and Reagan, and how their actions compare to those of
President Trump.
A. The Need for “New Blood”
Any evaluation of presidential influence on the courts must include Franklin
D. Roosevelt’s infamous Court-packing plan. On February 5, 1937, in the aftermath
of an overwhelming electoral victory, Roosevelt proposed his Court-packing
legislation to Congress. 27 The plan called for an additional six justices to be added
to the Court, bringing the total number of justices to fifteen. 28 In his address to
Congress, Roosevelt described his concerns with a “judicial backlog” and the
perceived inability of older justices to hear cases in an expedient manner. 29 As
William Ross explains regarding this attack on the physical and mental capacities of
the justices, “historians agree that one of Roosevelt’s worst tactical blunders was his
disingenuous contention that the Justices were tired old men who were unable to
shoulder their workload.” 30

and the Constitution, 9 STUD. AM. POLITICAL DEV. 55, 55 (1995).
23. 5 U.S. 137, 142 (1803); see also Whittington supra note 22, at 87.
24. See Friedman, supra note 21, at 377; see also GEYH, supra note 14, at 53.
25. See, e.g., Dawn E. Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial
Interpretation: Who Determines Constitutional Meaning?, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105
(2004).
26. See ENGEL, supra note 3, at 323.
27. William G. Ross, When Did the “Switch in Time” Actually Occur?: Re-discovering
the Supreme Court's “Forgotten” Decisions of 1936-1937, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1153, 1154
(2005).
28. Id.
29. ROBERT SCIGLIANO, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESIDENCY 44 (1971).
30. Ross, supra note 27, at 1215.

2018]

STICKS, STONES, AND SO-CALLED JUDGES

17

In July of 2016, when Donald Trump was the presumptive Republican nominee
for President, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, in unscripted comments given to a CNN
reporter during an interview, called Trump a “faker,” elaborating that she believes
“he has no consistency about him at all” 31 and, in a separate interview, claimed that
she “can’t imagine what the country would be—with Donald Trump as our
president.” 32 Trump wasted no time in denouncing Justice Ginsburg’s comments,
taking to Twitter to announce that “Justice Ginsburg of the U.S. Supreme Court has
embarrassed all by making very dumb political statements about me. Her mind is
shot - resign!” 33 Many media outlets and scholars referred to the exchange between
a sitting Supreme Court justice and a presidential nominee as “unprecedented,” 34
and Ginsburg’s comments were widely criticized as being out of line by individuals
from both ends of the political spectrum, as well as many in the legal profession who
questioned what Ginsburg’s comments would mean in cases involving the Trump
administration that would inevitably come before the Court. 35
While Trump’s response to Ginsburg’s comments is greatly lacking in nuance
and sophistication and seemingly comes from a motivation to insult, rather than to
influence the make-up of the Court, it must be noted that Trump’s comments bear
some resemblance to the rationale put forward by Roosevelt. 36 The idea that justices
who reach a certain age are no longer able to adjudicate as effectively—or in Justice
Ginsburg’s case are more prone to making ill-advised decisions—was essentially
Roosevelt’s original rationale for attempting to “infuse new blood into all our
Courts” in order to “to make the administration of all Federal justice speedier and,
therefore, less costly.” 37 While Trump’s comments were made as a candidate, they
are relevant in noting that attacks upon the capacities of judges are seemingly not a
new phenomenon, and that President Trump is certainly not the first to raise this
concern. 38
B. Court-Packing of Old and a Modern Resurgence
Roosevelt seemed to focus more on the real motive behind the Court-packing
legislation in one of his subsequent “fireside chats,” in which he addressed the nation

31. Joan Biskupic, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg Calls Trump ‘A Faker,’ He Says She
Should Resign, CNN (July 13, 2016, 7:45 AM), https://perma.cc/UT4E-5HPE.
32. Adam Liptak, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, No Fan of Donald Trump, Critiques Latest Term,
N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2016), https://perma.cc/4CM2-NFJZ.
33. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 12, 2016, 9:54 PM),
https://perma.cc/KAN3-86B8.
34. See Aaron Blake, Here’s How Unprecedented Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Anti-Trump
Comments Were, WASH. POST (July 13, 2016), https://perma.cc/5G34-B7YN.
35. See Aaron Blake, In Bashing Donald Trump, Some Say Ruth Bader Ginsburg Just
Crossed a Very Important Line, WASH. POST (July 11, 2016), https://perma.cc/2NGJ-YQFV.
36. See Jonathan R. Nash, Trump Is Not the First President to Criticize the Judiciary, THE
HILL (Feb. 9, 2017, 5:00 PM), https://perma.cc/Y3EG-V5B8.
37. Franklin D. Roosevelt: “Fireside Chat,” AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Mar. 9, 1937),
https://perma.cc/7VCP-3572.
38. See Nash, supra note 36.
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by radio about the Court-packing plan. 39 In this address, Roosevelt detailed the need
to protect New Deal legislation from being defeated by the Supreme Court. 40 In one
of the more memorable parts of the address, Roosevelt described the three branches
of government as a team of three horses, pulling a carriage being directed by the
American people, but that one of the three horses (the judiciary) was not pulling
anymore. 41 Roosevelt also spoke of the precariousness of a recent 5-4 decision and
how the Court was very close to “throw[ing] all the affairs of this great Nation back
into hopeless chaos.” 42 Roosevelt suggested that the nation was on the precipice of
yet another national emergency if immediate action was not taken, stating in part that
“the dangers of 1929 are again becoming possible, not this week or month perhaps,
but within a year or two.” 43 As Ross notes, the Court-packing plan was met with
widespread criticism from both politicians and the public alike. 44 The plan was
ultimately defeated by the so-called “switch in time,” in which the Court began
validating several pieces of New Deal legislation—including minimum wage
legislation. 45
While Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan was unsuccessful, the concept of Courtpacking has seen a revival of sorts in at least some ideological circles during
President Trump’s tenure in office. In November of 2017, Steven Calabresi, cofounder of the conservative Federalist Society, presented a proposal to Congress to
increase the size of the federal judiciary by somewhere between thirty and fifty
percent before the 2018 mid-term elections. 46 In other words, this expansion would
have given President Trump the ability to appoint twice as many judges in twelve
months as Obama did over his two terms as President. 47 In the words of Calabresi,
the plan was meant as a means of “Undoing President Barack Obama’s Judicial
Legacy,” though Calabresi also argued that this Court-packing plan could be justified
by “focusing on the problem of the federal courts’ caseloads and unpublished
opinions.” 48 This proposal was introduced despite the fact that President Trump is
currently filling an astonishing amount of judicial vacancies left over from the

39. Roosevelt, supra note 37.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four:
Law’s Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971, 982 (2000) (“Ordinary citizens also lambasted
the Court-packing plan and expressed serious concern about tampering with an independent
judiciary . . . [p]opular opinion shifted in response to political events, and political tides shifted
quickly with popular opinion.”); see also Michael Hiltzik, How a New Court-Packing Scheme
Could Save the Supreme Court from Right-Wing Domination, L.A. TIMES (July 2, 2018, 6:30
AM), https://perma.cc/PU9N-QH5K.
45. See Ross, supra note 27, at 1153; see also Joshua Zeitz, How Donald Trump Could
Pressure the Supreme Court, POLITICO (Feb. 14, 2017), https://perma.cc/DXU3-3YZB; West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
46. See Ronald A. Klain, Conservatives Have a Breathtaking Plan for Trump to Pack the
Courts, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2017), https://perma.cc/CJ3B-AVPP.
47. See id.
48. Steven G. Calabresi & Shams Hirji, Proposed Judgeship Bill, NW. PUB. L. & LEGAL
THEORY SERIES, No. 17–24, at 1, 5 (2017).
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Obama administration, which were effectively left open by Republican obstruction
in the Senate (not unlike what was done with the Merrick Garland nomination). 49 In
fact, President Trump is on track to have more confirmed appointments to the federal
appeals courts in his first two years in office than any other administration within
recent memory. 50
The Federalist Society, and most notably its Executive Vice President Leonard
Leo, has played a crucial role in advising the Trump administration on candidates
placed on President Trump’s “short list” of twenty-five candidates for the Supreme
Court, including the vetting and selection of Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh. 51
Under Leo’s leadership, the Federalist Society has helped create a “pipeline for
taking conservative law students and grooming them to be judges and public
figures.” 52 One report states that nearly half of President Trump’s nominees to the
federal judiciary thus far are either current or past members of the Federalist
Society. 53 Additionally, of the twenty-five individuals on President Trump’s short
list for the Supreme Court, all but one are either members of or are affiliated with the
Federalist Society. 54 In the wake of Justice Anthony Kennedy’s announcement that
he would retire from the Court, Leo quickly stepped away from his role with the
Federalist Society in order to spearhead President Trump’s search for Kennedy’s
replacement. 55
Besides the vetting of candidates and helping to create a list of potential nominees
for President Trump, Leo is also affiliated with an organization called the Judicial
Crisis Network, which spends millions of dollars on judicial races across the country,
including $17 million on defeating the nomination of Merrick Garland and
supporting the confirmations of Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh. 56 As one

49. See Klain, supra note 46; see also Caroline Fredrickson, The Least Dangerous
Branch—And the Last Hope of the Left, 12 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 121, 143 (2018).
50. Jordain Carney, Republicans Confirming Trump’s Court Nominees at Record Pace,
HILL (May 1, 2018, 4:52 PM), https://perma.cc/ZA8Z-WN7U. For additional discussion of the
differing numbers of judges confirmed between Obama and Trump, see Fredrickson, supra
note 49.
51. See Nolan D. McCaskill, Trump Releases Updated Short List of Potential Supreme
Court Nominees, POLITICO (Nov. 17, 2017, 4:48 PM), https://perma.cc/9YBD-TGUR; see also
Jess Bravin, Meet the Conservative Activist Who Plays Critical Role in Supreme Court Picks,
WALL ST. J. (July 1, 2018, 5:12 PM), https://perma.cc/EJ2C-QKRN; Fredrickson, supra note
49; Mark Landler & Maggie Haberman, Brett Kavanaugh Is Trump’s Pick for Supreme Court,
N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2018), https://perma.cc/KFQ4-DT9V.
52. Jennifer Bendery, Trump Isn’t Remaking the Supreme Court. Leonard Leo Is.,
HUFFPOST (July 2, 2018, 5:33 PM), https://perma.cc/YP3K-XHYN. The President of the
American Constitution Society, Caroline Fredrickson, states that “President Trump’s list
includes names of very young lawyers whose only track record is one of extreme
conservatism.” Fredrickson, supra note 49.
53. See Zoe Tillman, After Eight Years on the Sidelines, this Conservative Group Is
Primed to Reshape the Courts Under Trump, BUZZFEED (Nov. 20, 2017, 8:06 AM),
https://perma.cc/LRC7-XXZB.
54. Jay Michaelson, The Secrets of Leonard Leo, the Man Behind Trump’s Supreme Court
Pick, THE DAILY BEAST (July 9, 2018), https://perma.cc/W2X2-UPRM.
55. See Bendery, supra note 52.
56. Michaelson, supra note 54.
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commentator notes, “Leo effectively manages [the Federalist Society and the Judicial
Crisis Network] which work out of the same office and are funded by the money he
raises.” 57 In describing Leo’s role in influencing President Trump and George W.
Bush’s judicial appointments, Professor Carl Tobias stated in part that “[i]t’s
incredible. Certainly, [Leo has] had an outsize influence for any one person. I know
President George W. Bush relied on him a fair amount for two nominees, and in this
administration, I don’t think there’s ever been anything quite like it.” 58
While the Calabresi plan never gained serious momentum, calls for Court-packing
from liberal voices have greatly increased following the retirement of Anthony
Kennedy. 59 With President Trump now having two Supreme Court appointments in
his first term, and the possibility of more, many liberals fear a rightward shift on the
Court for decades to come. 60 Consequently, dozens of articles, blog posts, and tweets
were posted in the aftermath of Kennedy’s retirement announcement advocating for
Democrats to pack the Court in the coming years. 61 Professor Erwin Chemerinsky
claims that plans for increasing the size of the Supreme Court could materialize if
Democrats are successful in taking Congress and the presidency in 2020. 62 While
reacting to these calls for Court-packing, some commentators have rightly pointed
out that liberals should be wary of this plan of action. 63 If Roosevelt’s Court-packing
proposal is any indication, a modern liberal Court-packing plan could be very
unpopular with a large segment of the population. 64 Professor Chemerinsky
elaborated that, “[p]rogressives should be very careful about suggesting [courtpacking] might happen,” because of the backlash and conservative voter
mobilization that could result. 65 A liberal Court-packing plan has garnered support
from several law professors, though some of them voiced their opposition to the
Calabresi plan put forth only months earlier. 66 If anything, this discussion is meant
to illustrate the point made earlier in this Note that both political parties are willing
to shape the judiciary in ways that advance their political objectives, even if that
means being hypocritical at times. 67
Calabresi’s “efficiency” rationale for vastly increasing the size of the federal
judiciary is also similar to Roosevelt’s original justification for his Court-packing

57. Id.
58. Bendery, supra note 52.
59. See Josh Blackman, Don’t Try to Expand the Number of Supreme Court Justices,
NAT’L REV. (July 5, 2018, 2:15 PM), https://perma.cc/756K-BEWY.
60. See id.
61. See, e.g., Zach Carter, Hey Democrats: Pack the Court, HUFFPOST (June 27, 2018,
7:01 PM), https://perma.cc/9LYW-B3R2; Dylan Matthews, Court-Packing, Democrats’
Nuclear Option for the Supreme Court, Explained, VOX (July 2, 2018, 8:20 AM),
https://perma.cc/V73C-NC5Q.
62. Hiltzik, supra note 44.
63. Charles C.W. Cooke, Court Packing is a Fringe Fantasy, NAT’L REV. (July 2, 2018,
11:42 AM), https://perma.cc/TR47-Q9XW; see also Blackman, supra note 56.
64. Hiltzik, supra note 44; see also Cooke, supra note 63; Adam J. White, Rage at the
End of Justice Kennedy’s Camelot, WKLY. STANDARD (June 30, 2018, 6:59 PM),
https://perma.cc/5HSY-9B4S.
65. Hiltzik, supra note 44.
66. See Blackman, supra note 59; see also White, supra note 64.
67. See supra text accompanying note 11.

2018]

STICKS, STONES, AND SO-CALLED JUDGES

21

plan. Calabresi’s plan to “solve” the problem of increasing caseloads for federal
judges, on its face, seems innocuous enough, just as Roosevelt’s stated purpose of
making the Court more efficient in its decision-rendering is a seemingly noble
cause. 68 However, when examining the true purpose of these Court-packing
measures, it is clear that the underlying purpose is not efficiency but rather
ideology. 69 While Calabresi’s plan was not officially sanctioned by the Trump
administration or the President himself, its inclusion in this discussion of Courtpacking is necessary because of Calabresi’s prominent position in legal academia
and because of the way President Trump has kept his word on promising to appoint
Federalist Society-approved judicial nominees. 70 For Calabresi to put forth a
sweeping plan of this sort during the Trump presidency, there must be at least some
expectation that a plan like this could realistically be passed by Congress. 71
Arguments regarding efficiency have led to substantial changes in the makeup of the federal judiciary in the past. In 1980, Jimmy Carter oversaw the breakingup of the southern Fifth Circuit, which was justified by proponents as necessary
because of the overwhelming amount of cases burdening the system, though it was
not an attempt to break up a circuit based on ideology. 72 For his part, President
Trump has been harshly critical of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, particularly
because of the adverse rulings on the travel ban (discussed below). 73 In response to
these rulings, as well as an adverse ruling from the Ninth Circuit concerning the
Trump administration’s targeting of so-called “sanctuary cities,” President Trump
has stated that he has “absolutely” considered breaking up the Ninth Circuit. 74 Of
course, only Congress has the power to alter the make-up of judicial districts and
circuits, but President Trump theoretically, with a Republican-controlled House and
Senate, could push a bill through which could significantly alter the Ninth Circuit,
which would seem to represent more of an ideological motivation as opposed to an
efficiency rationale. 75
President Trump has explicitly rejected an efficiency rationale for increasing
the number of immigration judges in the United States. In June of 2018, as the debate
over family and child separations at the southern border dominated the national
conversation regarding the Trump administration’s immigration policies, Senate
Republicans stated that they were working on a plan to increase the number of
immigration judges in order to expedite the hearing process and reduce the backlog

68. See Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Trump Court-Packing Plan Is Based on a
Fiction, SLATE (Dec. 5, 2017, 6:51 PM), https://perma.cc/X4PK-DZRK.
69. See Ilya Somin, The Case Against Court-Packing, WASH. POST (Nov. 27, 2017),
https://perma.cc/K2PL-RLNX.
70. See Tillman, supra note 53; see also Blackman, supra note 59 (“[Calabresi’s] proposal
was destined to fall by the wayside, but for the identity of its lead author”).
71. See Somin, supra note 69.
72. See Amber Phillips, Trump Keeps Throwing Shade on the 9th Circuit. But He
Probably Won’t Be Able to Break It Up, WASH. POST (June 13, 2017), https://perma.cc/6YKJRGFL.
73. See id.
74. See Sarah Westwood, Exclusive Interview: Trump ‘Absolutely’ Looking at Breaking
Up 9th Circuit, WASH. EXAMINER (Apr. 26, 2017, 5:00 PM), https://perma.cc/ECU6-J4VQ.
75. See Phillips, supra note 72.
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of immigration cases. 76 President Trump rejected these proposals as “crazy,” 77 and
he seemingly believes that the United States already has too many immigration
judges compared to other countries. 78 Moreover, an argument can be made that
President Trump fundamentally rejects the role of immigration judges in affording
due process to undocumented immigrants. 79 On Twitter, President Trump stated in
part that “[w]e cannot allow all of these people to invade our Country. When
somebody comes in, we must immediately, with no Judges or Court Cases, bring
them back from where they came. Our system is a mockery to good immigration
policy and Law and Order.” 80 Although immigration judges are technically a part of
the executive branch, this is one area where President Trump is unwilling to act even
in the face of case backlogs and perceived inefficiency. 81
C. Richard Nixon and Applying Pressure to the Court
Upon winning the 1968 election, Richard Nixon was able to quickly make two
key Supreme Court appointments, including Warren Burger and Harry Blackmun. 82
While Burger’s appointment was the result of a vacancy created by outgoing Chief
Justice Earl Warren, the seat filled by Blackmun became available under more
dubious circumstances. 83
John Dean, one of Nixon’s legal advisors, stated that when Nixon took office,
he was intensely focused on figuring out ways to create Supreme Court vacancies. 84
Nixon began looking at the most liberal justices on the Court, and he was made aware
of connections between Justice Abe Fortas—a Lyndon Johnson-appointee and
prominent liberal on the Court—and a Wall Street financier who had been convicted
of financial crimes. 85 Nixon, with the aid of his Justice Department, began

76. Michael D. Shear, Sheryl Gay Stohlberg & Thomas Kaplan, G.O.P. Moves to End
Trump’s Family Separation Policy, but Can’t Agree How, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2018),
https://perma.cc/9WWA-2V2T.
77. Id.
78. See Salvador Rizzo, Trump’s Claim that U.S. Is Only Country with ‘Thousands’ of
Immigration Judges, WASH. POST (May 17, 2018), https://perma.cc/8MYY-8R5E. In one
statement on the subject, Trump stated in part that, “[a]nd just to show how ridiculous—we
have judges. We have thousands of judges. Do you think other countries have judges? We give
them, like, trials.” Id.
79. See Salvador Rizzo, President Trump’s Misconceptions About Immigration Courts
and Law, WASH. POST (June 26, 2018), https://perma.cc/9BTA-K8TG.
80. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 24, 2018, 8:02 AM),
https://perma.cc/49G2-TWFT.
81. See Raul A. Reyes, Immigration Judges Deserve Respect—Not Unfounded Criticism,
THE HILL (June 30, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://perma.cc/GAZ9-Z6LC.
82. See ENGEL, supra note 3, at 306–07.
83. See id.
84. See JOHN W. DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE NIXON
APPOINTMENT THAT REDEFINED THE SUPREME COURT 5 (2001); see also Richard K. Neumann
Jr., The Revival of Impeachment as a Partisan Political Weapon, 34 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
161, 262 (2007).
85. See DEAN, supra note 84, at 5.
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investigating Fortas and leaking damaging information to the press. 86 Besides the
mounting public and media pressure, Nixon’s Justice Department increased the
pressure on Fortas by convening a grand jury to determine whether Fortas’s wife had
obstructed justice. 87
Fortas resigned shortly thereafter, succumbing to Nixon’s successful strategy
to use the full force of the executive branch to pressure a sitting Supreme Court
justice to resign. 88 Fortas was considered one of the most liberal justices on the Court
at the time, save for Earl Warren, who retired shortly after Nixon took office. 89
Moreover, Warren himself had previously faced calls for impeachment from those
who were at odds with the Warren Court’s decisions on some of the more
controversial issues of the time, including racial desegregation and school prayer. 90
Fresh off of the resignation of Abe Fortas, the Nixon administration set its
sights on another liberal Supreme Court Justice: William O. Douglas. 91 However,
the Nixon administration had been looking closely at Douglas since the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) began auditing him only five days after Nixon took office. 92
Besides the IRS, White House aid John Ehrlichman had hired a private investigator
to monitor Douglas’s movements, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), led
by J. Edgar Hoover, was also conducting an open investigation of Douglas and his
business dealings, including a wiretap on Douglas’s phones. 93 Then-Republican
minority leader Gerald Ford led the movement for impeachment against Douglas,
who he called on to resign. 94 While Dean states that Ford never fully explained why
he went after Douglas, “[Attorney General] John Mitchell believed that Ford was
acting at the direct request of the president.” 95 The impeachment effort ultimately
failed to garner enough support, and Douglas remained on the Court until his
retirement in 1975, intentionally staying on the Court long enough that Nixon could
not appoint his replacement. 96 Thus, it is clear that, as Dean concludes, Nixon and
those around him “[m]isused the resources and powers of the Department of Justice,
and other executive branch agencies, to literally unpack the Court by removing lifetenured justices they found philosophically or politically untenable.” 97
Presidents are not given the power to remove Supreme Court justices by the
Constitution and applying the full force of the executive branch to target individual
members of the judiciary, particularly based on perceived ideological leanings, is
arguably a textbook example of altering the courts using what can be described as a
“partisan weapon.” 98 While President Trump has not shied away from encouraging
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Id. at 26.
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his Department of Justice to investigate past political foes, such as Hillary Clinton
and former FBI Director James Comey, 99 there is certainly nothing to indicate that
President Trump has considered using the Nixonian tactics described above against
members of the judiciary. It is important to remember, however, that the revelations
about Nixon’s behavior regarding pressuring Supreme Court justices to leave the
Court only became known years later when written about by those such as John
Dean. 100 As Dean notes, Nixon called Abe Fortas the day Fortas resigned to “express
his sympathy,” and while Fortas likely suspected the Nixon administration had
something to do with his ouster, there was no public showing to implicate the
President. 101 Similarly, Justice Douglas, who narrowly escaped impeachment,
mentioned the idea to former Chief Justice Warren that he thought Nixon opposed
his impeachment, while it is now clear that behind closed doors Nixon was
orchestrating the entire scheme. 102
While not necessarily “pressuring” judges to resign, President Trump has
targeted individual members of the judiciary with whom he disagrees. 103 However,
on the surface, President Trump’s motivation for the targeting of individual judges
does not seem to be to create vacancies in a Nixonian fashion, but rather his attacks
on individual judges seem to come from a place of personal animus based upon cases
involving President Trump’s personal economic interests, as in the Trump University
case, and his political objectives. 104
1.

The “Mexican” Judge

On May 27, 2016, in front of a crowd gathered in San Diego, President Trump
lamented his perceived unfair treatment at the hands of U.S. District Court Judge
Gonzalo Curiel, who was then overseeing the class action lawsuit against Trump
University. 105 In what was described by one news report as “a 12-minute

99. See Louis Nelson, Trump Ratchets Up Call for DOJ to Investigate Hillary Clinton,
POLITICO (Nov. 3, 2017), https://perma.cc/K5EL-EMXC; see also Louis Nelson, Comey on
Trump Calling for Him to be Jailed: ‘This is Not OK,’ POLITICO (Apr. 17, 2018, 4:26 PM),
https://perma.cc/2VDG-H5TD; Louis Nelson, Trump Suggests Huma Abedin Be Jailed After
State Department Email Release, POLITICO (Jan. 2, 2018, 8:38 AM), https://perma.cc/HJS6S57A (“The president’s suggestion that the Department of Justice probe his political enemies
breaks with a longstanding tradition that the department operate free from political
influence.”).
100. See DEAN, supra note 84.
101. See id. at 26.
102. See id.
103. See Hanna Trudo, Trump Escalates Attack on ‘Mexican’ Judge, POLITICO (June 2,
2016, 10:05 PM), https://perma.cc/3P8N-XD82; see also Ashley Killough, Gorsuch:
Criticism of Judges—Including Trump’s— ‘Disheartening,’ CNN (Mar. 22, 2017),
https://perma.cc/Q43V-WN87; Kyle Balluck, Trump Calls on Ginsburg to Resign: ‘Her Mind
Is Shot’, THE HILL (July 13, 2016, 6:43 AM), https://perma.cc/R388-D78M.
104. See Kristine Phillips, All the Times Trump Personally Attacked Judges—and Why His
Tirades are ‘Worse than Wrong,’ WASH. POST (Apr. 26, 2017), https://perma.cc/GHY5KDF6; see also In His Own Words: The President’s Attacks on the Courts, BRENNAN CTR.
FOR JUSTICE (June 5, 2017), https://perma.cc/QR6S-WBWA.
105. See Trudo, supra note 103.
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diatribe,” 106 Trump discussed the history of the case and accused Curiel of being “a
hater” before stating that “[w]hat happens is the judge, who happens to be, we
believe, Mexican, which is great. I think that’s fine.” 107 When asked to clarify his
comments about Curiel’s racial heritage, Trump stated that Curiel’s MexicanAmerican heritage was “an absolute conflict,” and he further stated that “I’m building
a wall. It’s an inherent conflict of interest.” 108 Curiel was born and raised in Indiana
and is of Mexican-American heritage. 109 The case eventually settled for $25 million
in what the Attorney General of New York deemed “a stunning reversal” by
President Trump, who had previously vowed to take the case to trial. 110
Of course, the sentiments about Judge Curiel took place before Trump became
President. However, Trump’s criticisms of Curiel are relevant because, not only did
Trump indicate that judges of Mexican-American heritage would be unable to fairly
adjudicate proceedings completely unrelated to his immigration policies, but he also
implied that he believes it is possible that judges who are Muslim might not be able
to hear cases in which he is involved. 111 Using this line of reasoning, what kinds of
judges would be able to hear cases involving President Trump or his policies? This
line of reasoning could just as easily be extended to women who serve as judges, as
many feel that President Trump has a highly objectionable history regarding his
interactions with women. 112 The current Supreme Court includes three women,
including Justice Sonia Sotomayor, who is of Hispanic heritage. 113 Using President
Trump’s reasoning, what other justices on the Supreme Court or judges on lower
federal courts are disqualified? The notion that judges cannot be impartial is
completely antithetical to the underlying principles of fairness and impartiality that
are so inherent to our shared understanding of the role of the judiciary. 114 As
Republican Speaker of the House Paul Ryan stated, President Trump’s comments
about Judge Curiel go “beyond the pale” of grievances past Presidents have levied
against judges. 115 Ironically, President Trump’s rhetoric about Judge Curiel has
seemingly shifted since Curiel granted a favorable ruling regarding President
Trump’s proposed border wall. 116 Though President Trump did not recognize Curiel
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(June 5, 2016, 9:16 AM), https://perma.cc/6UWG-55BD.
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Their Appearance, ABC NEWS (June 29, 2017, 12:56 PM), https://perma.cc/C8H5-3BD4.
113. See Charlie Savage, Sotomayor Sworn in as Supreme Court Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
8, 2009), https://perma.cc/PT3Z-YV5D.
114. See Vikram David Amar, Why Trump’s Attack on Judge Curiel Is Clearly Racist,
NEWSWEEK (June 25, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://perma.cc/K7XU-GRRS.
115. Nicki Rossoll, Paul Ryan Calls Trump’s Judge Comments ‘Beyond the Pale,’ ABC
NEWS (June 9, 2016, 5:31 PM), https://perma.cc/ZQ4J-7Z4L.
116. See Tal Kopan, Judge Curiel, Once Attacked by Trump, Rules Border Wall Can
Proceed, CNN (Feb. 28, 2018), https://perma.cc/CV7P-QE5X.
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by name in his tweet and only referred to him as a “U.S. judge,” President Trump
stated that Curiel’s ruling was a “big legal win” for the Trump administration. 117
2.

So-called Judges

Another example of President Trump verbally criticizing members of the
judiciary can be found in his comments regarding the travel ban cases. In December
of 2015, while on the campaign trail, President Trump called for “a total and
complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country’s
representatives can figure out what the hell is going on.” 118 After his election,
President Trump followed through on this promise when, on January 27, 2017, he
signed an executive order banning entry of persons into the United States from seven
Muslim majority nations for ninety days, as well as banning immigration from Syria
indefinitely. 119 The signing of the executive order initiated widespread panic and
protest at airports across the United States, and numerous legal challenges were
filed. 120 One of those legal challenges came before U.S. District Court Judge James
Robart, who temporarily blocked enforcement of President Trump’s executive
order. 121 While the administration stated that it would file for an emergency stay of
the ruling, President Trump took to Twitter to voice his displeasure with the decision
in the following tweet: “The opinion of this so-called judge, which essentially takes
law-enforcement away from our country, is ridiculous and will be overturned!” 122
President Trump coupled this tweet with several others, which claimed that allowing
entry of individuals covered by the executive order into the country would lead to
“death and destruction,” as well as the idea that “[i]f something happens blame
[Robart] and [the] court system. People pouring in.” 123
President Trump was not immune from criticism from those within his own
party, and notably then-Supreme Court nominee Neil Gorsuch denounced President
Trump’s criticisms of Judge Robart as “disheartening” and “demoralizing.” 124 While
it is not clear whether Robart was one of them, several judges involved in the travel
ban cases received threats to their physical safety, which were significant and serious
enough to warrant increased security details from the U.S. Marshals in the aftermath

117. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 27, 2018, 8:28 PM),
https://perma.cc/H3F5-Y5BM; see also id.
118. Jenna Johnson, Trump Calls for ‘Total and Complete Shutdown of Muslims Entering
the United States,’ WASH. POST (Dec. 7, 2015), https://perma.cc/W6NN-585J.
119. See Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017).
120. See Michael D. Shear, New Order Indefinitely Bars Almost All Travel from Seven
Countries, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2017), https://perma.cc/M4EJ-SD39.
121. Matt Zapotosky, Lori Aratani, & Justin Jouvenal, Federal Judge Temporarily Blocks
Trump’s Entry Order Nationwide, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2017), https://perma.cc/QQ8UM7MM.
122. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 4, 2017, 5:12 AM),
https://perma.cc/PN7A-733G; see also id.
123. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 5, 2017, 12:39 PM),
https://perma.cc/232E-FN9R.
124. See Killough, supra note 103; see also Jonathan Mermin, Three Ways of Looking at
a President, 32 ME. B.J. 30, 31 (2017).
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of President Trump’s criticisms. 125 Law professor Neil Siegel wrote that it is
possible that, by making these types of comments about the judiciary, President
Trump is setting himself up for an opportunity to shift the blame onto the judiciary
for future terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. 126 While Roosevelt did not personally and
publicly attack judges in ways similar to President Trump, his fireside chat about the
Court-packing plan spoke of impending economic doom similar to what the country
went through in 1929, which could obviously create feelings of fear and anger by
members of the public towards the Supreme Court. 127 However, by targeting
individual judges for criticism, such as Curiel and Robart, President Trump is
focusing a national spotlight upon them that undoubtedly attracts the attention of
those in society who feel they need to take it upon themselves to right a perceived
wrong. 128 It is not yet clear whether this type of targeting will make it more likely
that certain judges will choose to leave the bench rather than face continued
criticisms and threats to their physical safety. 129
D.

Reagan’s Use of the Appointment Power

Ronald Reagan used ideological screening for judicial appointments as a
means of influencing the interpretation of the law. 130 Reagan ended the use of
nominating commissions established by Jimmy Carter, and instead, with the help of
then-Attorney General Edwin Meese, “placed responsibility for advising judicial
selection within [the Office of Legal Policy (OLP)].” 131 OLP was thus able to
advocate for screening potential judicial nominees based upon their “legal views,” 132
though one scholar referred to this screening as “engag[ing] in the most systematic
philosophical screening of judicial candidates seen in the nation’s history.” 133 When
he left office, Reagan had appointed forty-seven percent of the federal judiciary at
the time, including four Supreme Court justices and approximately 372 federal
judges in total. 134 The process by which these judges were selected is described as
emanating from the Reagan administration’s “commitment to seek out and nominate
those in harmony with the President’s judicial philosophy.” 135
Ironically (or perhaps not so ironically), Meese was in attendance at the
nomination announcement of Brett Kavanaugh and was personally recognized by

125. See Evan Perez, Shimon Prokupecz & Ariane de Vogue, Threats Against Judges in
Immigration Ban Cases Leads to Increased Security, CNN (Feb. 9, 2017),
https://perma.cc/DT6C-ZK94.
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President Trump in his remarks. 136 Meese was in attendance because, as one
commentator noted, after the nominations of Sandra Day O’Connor and Anthony
Kennedy, who were viewed by some as being less conservative than many
conservatives hoped for, Meese “made it a mission since then to advise subsequent
Republican Presidents on judicial nominations,” including President Trump. 137 At
the same nomination ceremony, President Trump made a problematic claim
regarding Reagan and judicial appointments when he said, “[i]n keeping with
President Reagan’s legacy, I do not ask about a nominee’s personal opinions. What
matters is not a judge’s political views but whether they can set aside those views to
do what the law and the [C]onstitution require.” 138 The existing literature on Reagan
and Meese’s ideological screening of nominees fully contradicts President Trump’s
assertion that the Reagan administration was not concerned with potential nominees
and their ideology; in fact, the evidence shows that the opposite was true. 139 During
Brett Kavanaugh’s remarks at the ceremony, he stated that “[n]o president has ever
consulted more widely or talked with more people from more backgrounds to seek
input about a Supreme Court nomination [than Trump has].” 140 Based on the facts
laid out above regarding President Trump’s rigid and consistent practice of choosing
candidates from a list created largely by Leonard Leo and the Federalist Society,
Kavanaugh’s statement is objectively inaccurate, and it is hard to believe that
Kavanaugh was unaware of the circumstances surrounding his appointment. 141
President Trump’s strict adherence to Federalist Society-recommended federal
judicial nominees seems strikingly similar to the type of ideological screening that
took place during the Reagan administration. 142 As Lee Epstein, Jeffrey Segal, and
Chad Westerland note, Presidents generally do not have personal knowledge of
specific nominees, and they rely on the lists created by advisors and
recommendations from external sources. 143 However, while past administrations
have traditionally consulted with outside groups about nominees, many believe that
the Federalist Society is playing a disproportionate role in President Trump’s filling
of judicial vacancies. 144 Trump even stated during the 2016 campaign that “we’re
going to have great judges, conservative, all picked by the Federalist Society.” 145
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COMMENTING ON CURRENT AND PAST CASES

One recent study has found that, while sometimes useful as a rhetorical tool in
speech-making, Presidents generally wait until after court rulings have been handed
down to weigh in. 146 Indeed, from Eisenhower through Obama, public remarks made
about cases before they were heard by the Supreme Court made up only five percent
of total remarks made by Presidents about Supreme Court cases. 147 One reason for
this result is that Presidents generally refrain from making comments that would lead
to accusations of them attacking “decisional independence,” especially in criminal
cases. 148 Presidents tend to comment much more frequently on cases that have
already been decided, 149 and there are several reasons why Presidents might choose
to publicly comment on these types of cases. Foremost among these reasons is that
Presidents recognize that the Supreme Court and its more controversial decisions can
serve as tools to motivate supporters to head to the polls on Election Day and to
engage with their elected officials. 150 As Engel notes, the Supreme Court was a top
voting issue in the 2008 campaign, 151 as well as the 2016 election, in which roughly
sixty-five percent of voters stated that the Supreme Court would be “a very important
factor” in who they supported in the election. 152 This section of the Note explores
the historical practice of past Presidents surrounding commenting on past and
pending cases as they relate to President Trump.
A. Past Court Decisions
Those in the Reagan administration were highly critical and vocal regarding
past Court decisions. 153 Reagan’s Attorney General, Edwin Meese, spoke of
“interpretational independence,” or the idea that the executive branch should have an
important role in interpreting constitutional meaning independently from the
courts. 154 In order to enact this vision of the role of the judiciary, Reagan and his
administration often criticized what they perceived to be “unelected judges” who
engaged in unconstitutional judicial activism. 155 Thus, in order to counter the
perceived flaws of the judiciary, Meese and OLP issued a series of reports about
various contemporary legal issues. 156 Besides describing “the Reagan
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administration’s view of the correct interpretation of the law” on a given issue, the
reports also included “lists of Supreme Court decisions that OLP considered
‘consistent’ and ‘inconsistent’ with the administration’s positions.” 157
In contrast to the widespread condemnation of specific Supreme Court cases
within the Reagan administration, Obama, while making his constitutional views
about a recently decided Supreme Court case known to the public, received negative
pushback. In January of 2010, the Supreme Court reached a decision in Citizens
United v. FEC, in which the Court removed many of the barriers to corporate
financing of political campaigns using the rationale that preventing this type of
behavior was an impermissible restriction on free speech. 158 Just days later at the
State of the Union Address, Obama, with six Supreme Court justices sitting in the
front row, criticized the ruling, saying “[w]ith all due deference to separation of
powers, last week the Supreme Court reversed a century of law that, I believe, will
open the floodgates for special interests, including foreign corporations, to spend
without limit in our elections.” 159 Justice Samuel Alito, who voted with the majority
in Citizens United, was captured by a television camera shaking his head as the
President was speaking, and he appeared to say the words “not true.” 160
Reactions to the exchange between Obama and Alito were mixed, with some
legal scholars expressing disappointment in both of them, in one instance calling it
“an unfortunate display for both branches.” 161 While some compared Obama’s
criticism of the Court to that of Franklin Roosevelt, legal scholars such as Professor
Jack Balkin stated that there is a significant difference between mentioning a Court
decision in a short paragraph of a speech, as opposed to Roosevelt’s widespread
campaign to discredit the Court’s New Deal-era rulings. 162 Another interesting
opinion on the State of the Union backlash came from Robert E. Welch III, a Superior
Court judge from Massachusetts. 163 Welch stated that those who jumped at the
opportunity to criticize Obama needed to “toughen up,” as Obama’s comments were
“rather restrained,” and lower court judges, particularly those involved in highlypublicized criminal cases, are “subjected to at least this level of criticism on a
frequent basis.” 164 Regardless of which side of the argument one ends up on,
Obama’s remarks, though relatively tame compared to the tactics of the Reagan
administration or Roosevelt, clearly caused a stir among political elites and opened
a dialogue about the appropriate boundaries around Presidents and their criticisms of
judicial opinions.
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It is unclear how the Trump administration will handle past Supreme Court
precedent.
Arguably President Trump’s most prominent Supreme Court victory came on
June 26, 2018, when the Court ruled that the Trump travel ban was constitutional. 165
In response to the ruling, President Trump stated that the Court’s decision was “a
tremendous victory for this country.” 166 One can only wonder what President
Trump’s response would have been had the Court ruled against the travel ban. After
all, in the lower court decisions regarding the travel ban President Trump coined the
term “so-called judge,” as well as implying that any future acts of terrorism in the
United States can be directly attributed to the so-called judge. 167 This past term,
President Trump also weighed in on the decision in Janus v. AFSCME, 168 a case in
which the conservative members of the Court held 5-4 that requiring nonunion
employees to pay so-called “fair share fees” is violative of free speech. 169 President
Trump seemed to focus on the political effects the decision would have, tweeting in
part that the decision would be a “[b]ig loss for the coffers of the Democrats!” 170
While the Court has arguably not yet decided a case as controversial as Citizens
United during President Trump’s tenure in office, President Trump will almost
certainly have opportunities to comment on additional high-profile cases within his
first term. Moreover, President Trump, as outlined previously, has shown a
propensity to comment on cases involving his economic and political interests, and
assuming that a case involving sanctuary cities or presidential pardon powers does
come before the Court in the future, it seems likely that President Trump will weigh
in either before or after the decision (or both) by potentially targeting individual
justices who decide against him. 171 Obama’s comments at the State of the Union,
while personal in that the justices were in attendance that night, were not directed at
any one justice, nor did he question the authority of the judges to decide
constitutional issues such as those presented in Citizens United. 172 Obama disagreed
with the law, but not the underlying legitimacy of the justices to decide such
questions.
Additionally, it is unclear whether or not Attorney General Jeff Sessions will
follow in the footsteps of Meese in outlining the administration’s views on past

165. See Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. ___ (2018); see also Adam Liptak & Michael D.
Shear, Trump’s Travel Ban Is Upheld by Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2018),
https://perma.cc/A5ZA-B5RC.
166. Alexander Mallin, President Trump Calls Travel Ban Ruling ‘A Great Victory’ for
the Constitution, ABC NEWS (June 26, 2018, 6:58 PM), https://perma.cc/L5UU-NH6E.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 122–23.
168. 585 U.S. ___ (2018).
169. Irina Ivanova, Supreme Court Rules Against Paying for Union Representation in
Janus v. AFSCME, CBS NEWS (June 27, 2018, 10:12 AM), https://perma.cc/Z8D5-ZTKS.
170. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 27, 2018, 7:11 AM),
https://perma.cc/E9JP-73GP.
171. See, e.g., Veronica Stracqualursi, Trump Suggests He’ll Take Sanctuary Cities Case
to Supreme Court, ABC NEWS (Apr. 26, 2017, 10:02 AM), https://perma.cc/6R9A-MFVW;
Neil Lloyd, Presidential Pardons are Reviewable by the Courts, SLATE (June 8, 2018, 8:00
AM), https://perma.cc/RU4S-T7FU.
172. See Welch, supra note 3, at 114–15.
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Supreme Court cases. 173 For example, Sessions stated in his confirmation hearings
that he would defend Roe v. Wade 174 as a legitimate decision of the Court, even
though he believed it was wrongly decided. 175 However, President Trump stated
several times during the 2016 campaign that he believed Roe would be overturned if
he won, and President Trump has indicated that being pro-life is necessary in order
to pass the “litmus test” to get on the Court, despite his advisors telling him to
publicly say otherwise. 176 Thus, it is unclear where Roe and the Court’s subsequent
decisions stand with the Trump administration. 177
B. Pending Court Decisions
1.

Pending Supreme Court Cases

One recent example of presidential influence on a pending Court decision in
the non-criminal context involves Obama. In April of 2012, as the Supreme Court
was deliberating its decision regarding Obama’s signature health care law, the
Affordable Care Act, 178 Obama made several remarks about the case in a speech
from the Rose Garden. 179 Among other comments, Obama stated “[u]ltimately, I am
confident that the Supreme Court will not take what would be an unprecedented,
extraordinary step of overturning a law that was passed by a strong majority of a
democratically elected Congress.” 180 Many in the press, as well as some legal
scholars such as Harvard Law professor Laurence Tribe, agreed that Obama’s
remarks, which were viewed by some as an attempt to influence justices on the Court,
were out of step with the idea that “[p]residents should generally refrain from
commenting on pending cases during the process of judicial deliberation” because
these comments can “can contribute to an atmosphere of public cynicism.” 181
Others, however, such as Walter Dellinger, former solicitor general during the
Clinton administration, expressed sentiments that Obama was perfectly justified in
making these remarks, and that “‘[t]he justices’ life tenure secures their
independence. There is no reason that issues before the [C]ourt should be fenced off
from public debate.” 182 Just months later, the Supreme Court held that the so-called
“individual mandate” provision of the Affordable Care Act was constitutional as a

173. See supra text accompanying note 157.
174. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
175. See Dan Merica, Sessions Pledges to Respect Roe v. Wade Decision Despite Personal
Beliefs, CNN (Jan. 10, 2017), https://perma.cc/9KPT-U5TF.
176. Barbara Sprunt, Trump Downplays Roe v. Wade Litmus Test as He Considers a
Supreme Court Nominee, NPR (July 1, 2018, 3:25 PM), https://perma.cc/3EFJ-PH6V.
177. See id.
178. Nat'l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
179. See Corbett Daly, Obama: Supreme Court Overturning Health Care Would be
“Unprecedented,” CBS NEWS (Apr. 2, 2012, 5:36 PM), https://perma.cc/Y59B-GU7C.
180. Id.
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legitimate use of the taxing power, scoring a “dramatic victory for Obama and
Democrats’ decades-long effort to enact a health-care law.” 183
President Trump has not yet made any widely publicized comments regarding
pending Supreme Court cases during his first two years in office. However, it should
be noted that the comments made by Obama in the previous instance were not about
a criminal case, and Obama did not have to worry about exposing potential jurors to
information that would preclude them from making a fair assessment of the case.
Obama, a former professor of constitutional law, was arguably making a statement
which he believed was within the boundaries of normal presidential behavior.184
Obama’s comments seem more like what Professor Friedman refers to as the
President using the “bully pulpit” to send “signals” to the judicial branch. 185 This
type of signaling between branches, according to Friedman, “permit[s] the other
players to calculate what the response to a given decision might be.” 186 Judges
receive a great deal of outside information, such as amicus briefs, in making their
decisions. 187 It seems hard to believe that a statement such as that made by Obama
about the pending case could have significantly influenced the thought processes of
the justices any more than an amicus brief might. 188
2.

Pending Criminal Cases

As noted at the beginning of this section, Presidents very rarely weigh in upon
pending criminal cases. 189 As Professor James Joseph Duane notes, the dangers of
Presidents weighing in on the outcomes of pending criminal cases is especially stark:
by amplifying the guilt or innocence of an accused via speeches, tweets, or
interviews, the President’s words reach tens of millions of potential jurors who could
be improperly influenced regarding the culpability of the accused, and thus this
reduces the chance that the accused will receive a fair trial. 190 Consequently, there
are very few examples of Presidents weighing in on the guilt of the accused in
criminal trials, though President Trump’s first two years in office have provided
several.
In 1970, as notorious murderer and cult leader Charles Manson was on trial in
California, President Richard Nixon stated in comments to reporters that Manson
“was guilty, directly or indirectly, of eight murders without reason.” 191 After

183. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Upholds Obama’s Health-Care Law, WASH. POST
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145–46 (1998)).
188. See id.
189. See Eshbaugh-Soha & Collins, supra note 146, at 639.
190. See James Joseph Duane, What Message Are We Sending to Criminal Jurors When
We Ask Them to “Send a Message” With Their Verdict?, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 565, 675–76 n.367
(1995).
191. Peter Baker, Trump Abandons Idea of Sending Terror Suspect to Guantanamo, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 2, 2017), https://perma.cc/27EU-J3FP.
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learning of the President’s comments, Manson’s attorneys moved for a mistrial, and
within hours Nixon was forced to make an additional statement, reinforcing his belief
in the presumption of innocence by stating that “the last thing [he] would do is
prejudice the legal rights of any person, in any circumstances.” 192
Shortly after the bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City in April of
1995, President Bill Clinton made five public statements condemning the attack and
stating that the government would seek the death penalty for those responsible,
though at the time no suspects had yet been charged in connection with the
bombing. 193 In this case, the comments of Clinton and Attorney General Janet Reno
advocating for the death penalty did not prevent the government from successfully
pursuing the execution of Timothy McVeigh in 2001, though McVeigh’s attorneys
did ask the court to prevent Reno’s involvement in the decision-making process
about sentencing because of her past comments. 194 At least at the time, Clinton’s
words about the course of action were widely praised by members of Congress from
both sides of the aisle, as well as in the press. 195
President Trump, in contrast with the two isolated examples provided above,
has shown an unusual tendency to weigh in on pending criminal cases. This section
will discuss President Trump’s actions and compare them with Nixon and Clinton.
It should be noted that, as this Note is being written, President Trump has weighed
in on high-profile criminal cases on numerous occasions, and there is nothing to
indicate that this type of behavior will not continue throughout the remainder of the
Trump presidency. 196
i. “Dirty Rotten Traitor”
On October 16, 2017, Army Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl pleaded guilty before a
military judge to desertion and misbehavior before the enemy, a charge levied against
Bergdahl for endangering the lives of those who were sent to find him after he
voluntarily left his post while deployed in Afghanistan in 2009. 197 Bergdahl was
subsequently captured by the Taliban and was imprisoned and tortured until five
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USA TODAY (Aug. 16, 2017, 3:37 PM), https://perma.cc/SGJ7-29YF.
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195. See Devroy, supra note 193.
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a Pillar of Society: Law Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2018), https://perma.cc/X64WWGSC (“The war between the president and the nation’s law enforcement apparatus is unlike
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Comments, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2017), https://perma.cc/T7PF-6R35.
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years later, when the Obama administration made a deal with the Taliban for his
return in a “prisoner swap.” 198 Trump was demonstrably harsh in his criticism of
Bergdahl during the 2016 campaign, suggesting at various times that Bergdahl was
“a dirty rotten traitor” and that he should be executed via firing squad or returned to
the Taliban. 199 Upon pleading guilty, sentencing was delayed because of comments
made by President Trump. 200 When asked about a possible sentence for Bergdahl,
President Trump initially said that he could not comment, before adding “[b]ut I
think people have heard my comments in the past.” 201 In response to these latest
remarks, Bergdahl’s counsel filed a motion saying that President Trump’s comments
“amount to unlawful command influence, thus compromising Bergdahl’s chances to
receive a fair sentencing.” 202 While the military judge chose not to dismiss the case,
he did state that he would use Trump’s comments in mitigation during
sentencing. 203 Facing potential life in prison, Bergdahl was subsequently spared
from serving any time in prison and was ordered to be dishonorably discharged. 204
Within hours of the ruling, President Trump took to Twitter with the following
message: “The decision on Sergeant Bergdahl is a complete and total disgrace to
our Country and to our Military.” 205
Some military experts have stated that President Trump’s post-sentencing
comments further supported Bergdahl’s case to get his sentence overturned on
appeal, while also suggesting that President Trump may have been trying to exert
influence on those who are responsible for reviewing the sentence on appeal, as
everyone in the military ultimately reports to President Trump, the Commanderin-Chief. 206 Despite being counseled to refrain from commenting during
Bergdahl’s sentencing phase, President Trump seemingly could not resist giving a
wink and a nod to the press about “[his] comments in the past.” 207 Whereas
Nixon’s comments about Charles Manson seemed reckless to some degree, they
lack the motivation to sway the public about the sentence given to the defendant.
It is impossible to know exactly how the military judge in the Bergdahl case came to
render the sentence he did, but it certainly seems significant that a sitting President’s
words were not only used at the sentencing, but that they were used in mitigation.208
Perhaps Bergdahl would have received a greater sentence had President Trump kept
quiet, perhaps not.
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President Trump and the Death Penalty

In addition to weighing in on the Bergdahl case, in November of 2017,
President Trump again took to Twitter in two separate tweets to weigh in on the
status of an individual accused of killing eight people in lower Manhattan by
driving a rented pickup truck into individuals on a bike path. 209 President Trump
stated that authorities “[s]hould move fast. DEATH PENALTY!” 210 One former
federal prosecutor, in response to the President’s tweet, pointed out that by weighing
in on active cases, President Trump is making the outcome he desires more difficult
for prosecutors to attain, as in the Bergdahl case. 211 Weighing in on cases such as
the New York terror suspect and advocating for the death penalty before an
adjudication of guilt is similar to President Trump’s comments in 1989 that the socalled “Central Park Five”—who were accused of raping a white woman and were
later exonerated—should be executed. 212
When examined in the context of the Clinton administration’s comments after
the Oklahoma City bombing, there are several points of distinction. First, President
Trump’s comments came after a suspect had been apprehended by authorities,
whereas Clinton made a blanket statement that the death penalty would be sought for
whoever was responsible. Legal scholar and journalist Adam Liptak differentiates
Clinton and Reno’s comments from President Trump’s by stating that “they said that
if [the system] does work and someone is convicted, the [Oklahoma City bombing]
was heinous enough that they would seek the death penalty.” 213 While it is unclear
what President Trump meant when he said that the authorities should “move fast”
regarding the New York terror suspect, Liptak seems to think that President Trump’s
tweets “leapfrog” the part about the system working to attain a conviction and instead
that President Trump’s conclusion is that “this guy deserves the death penalty now,
and it’s a pity that we have to go through the rigmarole of an actual trial.” 214
iii. “Travesty of Justice”
On November 30, 2017, a jury acquitted an undocumented immigrant of
murder charges in the shooting death of an American citizen named Kate Steinle. 215
The death of Steinle was often cited by President Trump both on the campaign trail
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and as President to justify his policies regarding the border wall and ending the
existence of sanctuary cities. 216 After the verdict, President Trump took to Twitter
to denounce the decision of a jury to acquit the killer, stating in part that “[h]is
exoneration is a complete travesty of justice. BUILD THE WALL!” 217
This case provides yet another example of President Trump weighing in on an
individual defendant’s guilt or innocence. This example is different from the
Bergdahl example because here President Trump is criticizing a jury verdict, not a
sentence handed down by a lone judge. Like previous examples, President Trump’s
connection of the border wall and immigration policies to citizens’ physical safety
implies that the justice system will not do enough to protect citizens from harm. 218
Though the defendant in the Kate Steinle case was acquitted of murder charges, he
was found guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm, and under the direction of
President Trump, the Justice Department has since detained the defendant for
deportation proceedings. 219
iv. The Mueller Probe
As Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation into Russian meddling into the
2016 elections continues to lead to criminal indictments of individuals closely tied
to the Trump campaign, President Trump has chosen to selectively weigh in on
occasion. 220 However, in the following instances, President Trump has found
himself in the position of advocating for criminal defendants, rather than against
them as he did in the previous examples. For example, President Trump has spoken
out on occasion regarding the indictment and investigation into his former campaign
manager Paul Manafort. 221 While simultaneously trying to distance himself from
and defend Manafort, President Trump tweeted, “[w]ow, what a tough sentence for
Paul Manafort, who has represented Ronald Reagan, Bob Dole and many other top
political people and campaigns. Didn’t know Manafort was the head of the Mob.
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What about Comey and Crooked Hillary and all of the others? Very unfair!” 222 Here,
President Trump was referring to a decision by the judge in Manafort’s case to jail
Manafort prior to trial because he violated the terms of his house arrest; Manafort
was not “sentenced,” as President Trump stated. 223
President Trump was also very vocal regarding the investigation into his longtime
attorney Michael Cohen—who has since pleaded guilty to eight criminal counts—
which included search warrants being executed at several properties owned by
Cohen. 224 In response to these searches, President Trump stated that “it’s a disgrace,
it’s, frankly, a real disgrace, it’s an attack on our country in a true sense. It’s an attack
on all we stand for.” 225 President Trump’s comments about Manafort and Cohen
involve pending criminal cases, and it will be interesting to watch how the
President’s involvement with these individuals affects the outcomes of their
individual cases. 226 As the Mueller investigation continues, President Trump will
likely remain vocal about the charges against and sentences received by his
associates.
CONCLUSION
As Professor Geyh notes, judges often become political targets in the aftermath
of a regime change, as Presidents seek to make their own mark on the courts and
lessen the influence of their predecessors. 227 This phenomenon likely explains some
of President Trump’s interactions with the judiciary thus far, particularly the speed
with which he has filled judicial vacancies, and the potential that his allies in
Congress might create even more. 228 Since President Trump’s election, Americans
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have witnessed pushes by both conservatives and liberals to pack the Court; liberals
hope to diminish the influence of President Trump’s numerous appointments, while
the Calabresi plan was aimed at diluting eight years of judicial nominees under
Barack Obama. 229 The Federalist Society has served as a useful filter for President
Trump in choosing nominees, though it is concerning that a single outside interest
group has been able to exert this type of influence on something as critical and longlasting as federal judicial appointments. 230
It is also interesting that, as Geyh notes, today’s preference for “sound bites,”
including social media and the twenty-four-hour cable news cycle, has created a
means of “dissemination of information about the decisions judges make that render
those decisions easier to attack and harder to defend.” 231 As the examples in this
Note show, a significant amount of President Trump’s criticisms of judges and the
judicial process come in the form of tweets, a platform that President Trump uses to
reach millions of followers with messages that, by their nature, must be short,
concise, and often lacking in nuance. 232 When a political message is boiled down to
140 characters, there is an obvious risk that much of the sophistication and
development of logical reasoning is lost when compared to something like
Roosevelt’s fireside chats. 233 Moreover, President Trump’s use of Twitter has been
particularly harmful in the instances in which he weighs in on pending criminal cases
or chooses to attack individual judges. 234
Looking at the larger picture, the negative aspects of President Trump’s
interactions with the judiciary are not always as clear cut as they sometimes seem.
This Note concludes that President Trump’s repeated involvement with pending
criminal cases is wrong and deserving of condemnation. So too, President Trump’s
attacks on individual judges regarding their race or legitimacy are unusual, and seem
to go far beyond what past Presidents have found to be appropriate. However,
criticisms of President Trump’s legitimate use of the appointment power, and his
wholesale adherence to Federalist Society candidates, is more complicated when
compared with more aggressive uses of ideological screening by the Reagan
administration, or Nixon’s use of executive branch resources to investigate and
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pressure justices off of the Court. Overall, as rules of appropriate interactions
between the judiciary and the President are not set in stone, Presidents, to some
extent, have been able to make up the rules as they go along. Ultimately, it is up to
the public and the legal community to stand up for the integrity of the judiciary and
to express disapproval when the President goes beyond the norms and historical
practice of past Presidents.

